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Abstract
We investigate the problem of secure communication over parallel relay channel in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. We consider a four terminal relay-eavesdropper channel which consists of
multiple relay-eavesdropper channels as subchannels. For the discrete memoryless model, we establish
outer and inner bounds on the rate-equivocation region. The inner bound allows mode selection at
the relay. For each subchannel, secure transmission is obtained through one of two coding schemes at
the relay: decoding-and-forwarding the source message or confusing the eavesdropper through noise
injection. For the Gaussian memoryless channel, we establish lower and upper bounds on the perfect
secrecy rate. Furthermore, we study a special case in which the relay does not hear the source and
show that under certain conditions the lower and upper bounds coincide. The results established for the
parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel are then applied to study the fading relay-eavesdropper
channel. Analytical results are illustrated through some numerical examples.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In conventional point-to-point wired networks, security is facilitated by secret key sharing
between relevant parties based on some common cryptographic algorithm. The premise is that
only legitimate users have access to the encrypted messages and extraneous users (adversaries)
are unable to access any useful information. The wireless channel is characterized by its inherit
randomness and broadcast nature. Physical layer security exploits the basic attributes of the
wireless channel for instance, difference of the fading gains between the legitimate channel
(source to the legitimate receiver) and the channel to the adversary, to transmit information
securely to the legitimate receiver. Thus, it eradicates the need of secret key sharing.
The wiretap channel introduced by Wyner is a basic information-theoretic model which
incorporates physical layer attributes of the channel to transmit information securely [1]. Wyner’s
basic model consists of a source, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper (wiretapper) under
noisy channel conditions. Secrecy capacity is established when the eavesdropper channel (the
channel from the source to the eavesdropper) is a degraded version of the main channel (the
channel from the source to the legitimate receiver). The discrete memoryless (DM) channel
studied by Wyner is further extended to study some other channels for which secrecy capacity
is established, i.e., broadcast channels (BC) [2], [3], multi-antenna channels [4]–[6], multiple
access channels [7]–[9], fading channels [10], [11] etc. The idea of cooperation between users
in context of security was introduced by [12]. The intuition is that, when the main channel
is more noisy than the channel to the eavesdropper, cooperation between users is utilized to
achieve positive secrecy capacity. Secrecy is achieved by using the relay as a trusted node that
facilitates the information decoding at the destination while concealing the information from the
eavesdropper. A special case in which there is a physically degraded relay-eavesdropper channel
was studied in [13]. The case in which the relay does not acts as a trusted node is studied in
[14], [15].
In this paper, we study a parallel relay-eavesdropper channel. A parallel relay-eavesdropper
channel is a generalization of the setup in [12], in which each of the source-to-relay (S-
R), source-to-destination (S-D), source-to-eavesdropper (S-E), relay-to-destination (R-D) and
relay-to-eavesdropper (R-E) link is composed of several parallel channels as subchannels. The
eavesdropper is passive in the sense that it just listens to the transmitted information without
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modifying it. We only focus on the perfect secrecy rate, i.e., the maximum achievable rate at
which information is reliably sent to the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper is unable to
decode it.
The parallel relay-eavesdropper channel considered in this paper relates to some of the channels
studied previously. Compared to the parallel relay channel studied in [16], the parallel relay-
eavesdropper channel requires an additional secrecy constraint. The parallel relay-eavesdropper
channel without relay simplifies to a number of channels discussed previously. For example,
the parallel wiretap channel studied in [17], the parallel broadcast channel with confidential
messages (BCC) and no common message studied in [3].
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. For the
discrete memoryless case, we establish inner and outer bounds on the rate-equivocation region
for the parallel relay-eavesdropper channel. The inner bound is obtained through a coding
scheme in which, for each subchannel, the relay operates either in decode-and-forward (DF)
or in noise forwarding (NF) mode. We note that establishing our outer bound for DM case is
not straightforward and it does not follow directly from the single-letter outer bound for the
relay-eavesdropper channel developed in [12, Theorem 1]. Therefore a converse is needed. The
converse includes a re-definition of the involved auxiliary random variables, a technique much
similar to the one used before in the context of secure transmission over broadcast channels [3].
For the Gaussian memoryless model, we establish lower and upper bounds on the perfect
secrecy rate. The lower bound established for the Gaussian model follows directly from the
DM case. However, we note that establishing a computable upper bound on the secrecy rate
for the Gaussian model is non-trivial, and it does not follow directly from the DM case. In
part, this is because the upper bound established for the DM case involves auxiliary random
variables, the optimal choice of which is difficult to obtain. In this work, we develop a new upper
bound on the secrecy rate for the parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel. Our converse
proof uses elements from converse techniques developed in [5], [6] in context of multi-antenna
wiretap channel; and in a sense, can be viewed as an extension of these results to the parallel
relay-eavesdropper channel. This upper bound is especially useful when the multiple access part
of the channel is the bottleneck. We show that, in contrast to upper bounding techniques for
our model that can be obtained straightforwardly by applying recent results on multi-antenna
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wiretap channels [4]–[6], our upper bound shows some degree of separability for the different
subchannels.
We also study a special case in which the relay does not hear the source, for example due to
very noisy source-to-relay links. In this case we show that under some specific conditions noise-
forwarding on all links achieves the secrecy capacity. The converse proof follows from a new
genie-aided upper bound that assumes full cooperation between the relay and the destination, and
a constrained eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is constrained in the sense that it has to treat the
relay’s transmission as unknown noise for all subchannels, an idea used previously in context of a
class of classic relay-eavesdropper channel with orthogonal components [18]. These assumptions
turn the parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel into a parallel Gaussian wiretap channel,
the secrecy capacity of which is established in [3], [17].
Furthermore, we study an application of the results established for the parallel Gaussian relay-
eavesdropper channel to the fading relay-eavesdropper channel. We assume that perfect non-
causal channel state information (CSI) is available at all nodes. The fading relay-eavesdropper
channel is a special case of the parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel in which each
realization of a fading state corresponds to one subchannel. We illustrate our results through
some numerical examples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we establish outer and inner
bounds on the rate-equivocation region for the DM channel. In section III, we establish lower
and upper bounds on the perfect secrecy rate for the Gaussian model, and consider a special
case in which under some specific conditions secrecy capacity is achieved. In section IV, we
present an application of the results established in section III to the fading model. We illustrate
these results with some numerical examples in section V. Section VI concludes the paper by
summarizing its contribution.
Notations. In this paper, the notation X[1,L] is used as a shorthand for (X1, X2, . . . , XL), the
notation Xn[1,L] is used as a shorthand for (Xn1 , Xn2 , . . . , XnL) where for l = 1, . . . , L, Xnl :=
(Xl1, Xl2, . . . , Xln), the notation X[1,L],i is used as a shorthand for (X1,i, X2,i, . . . , XL,i), the
notation X1[1,L] is used as a shorthand for X11 × X12 . . . × X1L, E{.} denotes the expectation
operator, |X | denotes the cardinality of set X , L denotes the number of subchannels, the boldface
letter X denotes the covariance matrix. We denote the entropy of a discrete and continuous
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Fig. 1. The parallel relay-eavesdropper channel.
random variable X by H(X) and h(X) respectively. We define the functions C(x) = 1
2
log2(1+x)
and [x]+ = max{0, x}. Throughout the paper the logarithm function is taken to the base 2.
II. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNEL
In this section, we establish outer and inner bounds on the rate-equivocation region for the
discrete memoryless parallel relay-eavesdropper channel.
A. Channel Model
Definition 1: The parallel relay-eavesdropper channel consists of four nodes, a source, a
relay, a destination (legitimate receiver) and a passive eavesdropper. The communication takes
place over L subchannels. Fig. 1 represents the studied model. The source wishes to send
confidential messages to the destination, with the help of the relay to conceal them from passive
eavesdropper. The source encodes the confidential message W to (Xn11, Xn12, . . . , Xn1L) codewords
and broadcasts it over L subchannels to the relay and the destination. The relay helps to reduce
the uncertainty about the confidential message at the destination by re-encoding whatever it
has received from the source and transmits (Xn21, Xn22, . . . , Xn2L) codewords to the destination.
The outputs at the relay and destination are given by (Y n11, Y n12, . . . , Y n1L) and (Y n1 , Y n2 , . . . , Y nL )
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respectively. The passive eavesdropper overhears to the source and relay transmission over the
multiple-access link, which is denoted by (Y n21, Y n22, . . . , Y n2L).
More precisely, the parallel relay-eavesdropper channel consists of X1[1,L],X2[1,L] as finite input
alphabets and Y[1,L],Y1[1,L],Y2[1,L] as finite output alphabets. Since the channel is memoryless,
the transition probability distribution is given by
L∏
l=1
n∏
i=1
p(yl,i, y1l,i, y2l,i | x1l,i, x2l,i) (1)
where x1l,i ∈ X1l, x2l,i ∈ X2l, yl,i ∈ Yl, y1l,i ∈ Y1l and y2l,i ∈ Y2l, for l = 1, . . . , L and
i = 1, . . . , n. The symbols x1l and x2l are the source and relay inputs on subchannel l, and
y1l, yl, y2l are the channel outputs at the relay, destination and eavesdropper for the l-th subchannel
respectively.
Definition 2: The source sends a message W ∈ W = {1, . . . , 2nR} using a (2nR, n) code
consisting of
• a stochastic encoder at the source that maps W → Xn1[1,L],
• a relay encoder that maps fi(Y i−11[1,L])→ X2[1,L],i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
• a decoding function g(.), that maps the received codewords from the source and relay node
to get an estimate of the confidential message, g(Y n[1,L])→ Wˆ .
Definition 3: The average error probability of a (2nR, n) code is defined as
P ne =
1
2nR
∑
W∈W
p{g(Y n[1,L]) 6= W |W}. (2)
Due to the openness of the wireless medium, the eavesdropper listens for free to what the source
and relay transmit. It then tries to guess the information being transmitted. The equivocation rate
per channel use is defined as Re = H(W |Y n2[1,L])/n. Perfect secrecy for the channel is obtained
when the eavesdropper gets no information about the confidential message W from Y n2[1,L]. That
is, the equivocation rate is equal to the unconditional source entropy.
Definition 4 ( [1]): A rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) is achievable for the parallel relay-
eavesdropper channel, if for any ǫ > 0 there exists a sequence of codes (2nR, n) such that
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for any n ≥ n(ǫ)
H(W )
n
≥ R − ǫ,
H(W |Y n2[1,L])
n
≥ Re − ǫ,
P ne ≤ ǫ. (3)
B. Outer Bound
The following theorem provides an outer bound on the rate-equivocation region for the parallel
relay-eavesdropper channel.
Theorem 1: For a parallel relay-eavesdropper channel with L subchannels, and for any achiev-
able rate-equivocation pair (R,Re), there exists a set of random variables Ul → (V1l, V2l) →
(X1l, X2l)→ (Yl, Y1l, Y2l), l = 1, . . . , L, such that (R,Re) satisfies
R ≤ min
{ L∑
l=1
I(V1l, V2l; Yl),
L∑
l=1
I(V1l; Yl, Y1l | V2l)
}
Re ≤ R
Re ≤ min
{ L∑
l=1
I(V1l, V2l; Yl | Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul),
L∑
l=1
I(V1l; Yl, Y1l | V2l, Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul)
}
. (4)
Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix I.
Remark 1: The outer bound in Theorem 1 does not follow directly from the single-letter
outer bound on the rate-equivocation region established for the relay-eavesdropper channel [12,
Theorem 1]. Therefore a converse is required, in which we need to re-define the involved auxiliary
random variables. The technique used to re-define the auxiliary random variables has some
connection with the one used before in the context of secure transmission over broadcast channels
[3].
Remark 2: The region (4) reduces to the rate-equivocation region developed for the relay-
eavesdropper channel [12, Theorem 1] by setting L := 1 in (4).
Remark 3: The equivocation rate in Theorem 1 reduces to the secrecy capacity of the parallel
wiretap channel established in [3, Corollary 1] by removing the relay, i.e., by setting Y1l = X2l =
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V2l = φ. The resulting term
∑L
l=1 I(V1l; Yl | Ul)− I(V1l; Y2l | Ul) is maximized by Ul :=constant,
for l = 1, . . . , L.
C. Achievable Rate-Equivocation Region
In this subsection we establish an achievable rate-equivocation region for the parallel relay-
eavesdropper channel. The achievable region is established by the combination of two different
coding schemes, namely decode-and-forward and noise forwarding. In DF scheme, for each
message source associates a number of confusion codewords, the relay after receiving the
source codewords, decode it and re-transmits it towards the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper
(see [12, Theorem 2] for details). In the NF scheme the relay does not decode the source
codewords, but transmits confusion codewords independent from the source codewords, towards
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper (see [12, Theorem 3] for details).
Theorem 2: For a parallel relay-eavesdropper channel with L subchannels, the rate pairs in
the closure of the convex hull of all (R,Re) satisfying
R ≤ min
{∑
l∈A
I(V1l, V2l; Yl|Ul),
∑
l∈A
I(V1l; Y1l|V2l, Ul)
}
+
∑
l∈Ac
I(V1l; Yl|V2l)
Re ≤ R
Re ≤ min
{∑
l∈A
I(V1l, V2l; Yl|Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l|Ul),
∑
l∈A
I(V1l; Y1l|V2l, Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l|Ul)
}
+
∑
l∈Ac
I(V1l; Yl|V2l) + min
{∑
l∈Ac
I(V2l; Yl),
∑
l∈Ac
I(V2l; Y2l|V1l)
}
−min
{∑
l∈Ac
I(V2l; Yl),
∑
l∈Ac
I(V2l; Y2l)
}
−
∑
l∈Ac
I(V1l; Y2l|V2l), (5)
for some distribution p(ul, v1l, v2l, x1l, x2l, yl, y1l, y2l) = p(ul)p(v1l, v2l|ul)p(x1l, x2l|v1l, v2l)p(yl, y1l, y2l|x1l, x2l)
for l ∈ A and p(v1l, v2l, x1l, x2l, yl, y1l, y2l) = p(v1l)p(v2l)p(x1l|v1l)p(x2l|v2l)p(yl, y1l, y2l|x1l, x2l) for
l ∈ Ac, are achievable.
Outline of Proof:
The region in Theorem 2 is obtained through a coding scheme which combines appropriately
DF and NF schemes. In the statement of Theorem 2, sets A and Ac represent the subchannels
for which relay operates in DF and NF mode, respectively. The rates for the DF scheme can be
obtained readily by setting U := U[1,|A|], V1 := V1[1,|A|], V2 := V2[1,|A|], Y := Y[1,|A|], Y1 := Y1[1,|A|]
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and Y2 := Y2[1,|A|], for l ∈ A in [12, Theorem 2]. Similarly the rates for NF scheme can be
readily obtained by setting V1 := V1[1,|Ac|], V2 := V2[1,|Ac|], Y := Y[1,|Ac|], Y1 := Y1[1,|Ac|] and
Y2 := Y2[1,|Ac|], for l ∈ Ac in [12, Theorem 3].
Remark 4: For a parallel relay-eavesdropper channel in which all subchannels are degraded1,
i.e.,
p(yl, y1l, y2l|x1l, x2l) = p(y1l|x1l, x2l)p(yl|y1l, x2l)p(y2l|yl, y1l, x1l, x2l),
l = 1, . . . , L, the perfect secrecy capacity is given by
Cs =maxmin
{ L∑
l=1
[I(V1l, V2l; Yl | Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul)]+,
L∑
l=1
[I(V1l; Y1l | V2l, Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul)]+
}
(6)
where the maximization is over Ul → (V1l, V2l)→ (X1l, X2l)→ (Yl, Y1l, Y2l), for l = 1, . . . , L.
Proof: The achievability follows from Theorem 2 by setting Ac := ∅. The converse follows
along the lines of Theorem 1 and is omitted for brevity.
III. GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
In this section we study a parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel. Fig. 2 depicts the
studied model. We only focus on the perfectly secure achievable rates, i.e., (R,Re) = (R,R).
A. Channel Model
For a parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, the received signals at the relay, destination
and eavesdropper are given by
Y1l,i = X1l,i + Z1l,i
Yl,i = X1l,i +
√
ρ1lX2l,i + Zl,i
Y2l,i = X1l,i +
√
ρ2lX2l,i + Z2l,i (7)
1In parallel relay-eavesdropper channel if all subchannels are degraded, the entire relay-eavesdropper channel may not
necessarily be degraded.
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where i is the time index, {Z1l,i}, {Zl,i} and {Z2l,i} are noise processes, independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d) with the components being zero mean Gaussian random variables
with variances σ21l, σ2l and σ22l respectively, for l = 1, . . . , L. We assume that the source and
relay know the noise variances present at the receivers. For the subchannel l, X1l,i and X2l,i are
inputs from the source and relay nodes respectively. The parameter ρ1l indicates the ratio of the
R-D link signal-to-noise (SNR) to the S-D link SNR and ρ2l indicates the ratio of the R-E link
SNR to the S-E link SNR for subchannel l respectively. The source and relay input sequences
are subject to separate power constraints P1 and P2, i.e.,
1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
E[X21l,i] ≤ P1, (8)
1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
E[X22l,i] ≤ P2. (9)
B. Lower Bound on the Perfect Secrecy Rate
For the parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel (7), we apply Theorem 2 to obtain a
lower bound on the perfect secrecy rate.2
Corollary 1: For the parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel (7), a lower bound on the
perfect secrecy rate is given by
Rlowe = max∑
L
l=1
P1l≤P1,
∑
L
l=1
P2l≤P2,
0≤αl≤1, for l = 1, . . . , |A|
min
{∑
l∈A
C
(
P1l + ρ1lP2l + 2
√
α¯lρ1lP1lP2l
σ2l
)
− C
(
P1l + ρ2lP2l + 2
√
α¯lρ2lP1lP2l
σ22l
)
,
∑
l∈A
C
(
αlP1l
σ21l
)
− C
(
P1l + ρ2lP2l + 2
√
α¯lρ2lP1lP2l
σ22l
)}
+
∑
l∈Ac
C
(
P1l
σ2l
)
+min
{ ∑
l∈Ac
C
(
ρ1lP2l
P1l + σ2l
)
,
∑
l∈Ac
C
(
ρ2lP2l
σ22l
)}
−min
{ ∑
l∈Ac
C
(
ρ1lP2l
P1l + σ2l
)
,
∑
l∈Ac
C
(
ρ2lP2l
P1l + σ22l
)}
−
∑
l∈Ac
C
(
P1l
σ22l
)
. (10)
Proof: The achievability follows by applying Theorem 2 with the choice Ul := constant,
V1l := X1l, V2l := X2l, X1l := X˜1l +
√
α¯lP1l
P2l
X2l, α¯l := 1 − αl, X˜1l ∼ N (0, αlP1l) independent
2The results established for the DM case can be readily extended to memoryless channels with discrete time and continuous
alphabets using standard techniques [19, Chapter 7].
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of X2l ∼ N (0, P2l), where αl ∈ [0, 1] for l ∈ A; and X1l ∼ N (0, P1l) independent of X2l ∼
N (0, P2l) for l ∈ Ac. Straightforward algebra which is omitted for brevity gives (10).
The parameters P1l and P2l indicate the source and relay power allocated for transmission over the
l-th subchannel. In (10), after some straightforward algebra, the contribution to the equivocation
of information sent through NF (set Ac in Theorem 2) can be condensed by observing that
we only need to consider min{∑l∈Ac I(X2l; Y2l),∑l∈Ac I(X2l; Yl)} =∑l∈Ac I(X2l; Y2l), to get
higher secrecy rate. A simplified expression for Rlowe is given by
Rlowe = max∑
L
l=1
P1l≤P1,
∑
L
l=1
P2l≤P2,
0≤αl≤1, for l = 1, . . . , |A|
min
{∑
l∈A
[
C
(
P1l + ρ1lP2l + 2
√
α¯lρ1lP1lP2l
σ2l
)
− C
(
P1l + ρ2lP2l + 2
√
α¯lρ2lP1lP2l
σ22l
)]+
,
∑
l∈A
[
C
(
αlP1l
σ21l
)
− C
(
P1l + ρ2lP2l + 2
√
α¯lρ2lP1lP2l
σ22l
)]+}
+min
{ ∑
l∈Ac
[
C
(
P1l + ρ1lP2l
σ2l
)
− C
(
P1l + ρ2lP2l
σ22l
)]+
,
∑
l∈Ac
[
C
(
P1l
σ2l
)
+ C
(
ρ2lP2l
σ22l
)
− C
(
P1l + ρ2lP2l
σ22l
)]+}
. (11)
In (11), for each subchannel [.]+ appears because achievable secrecy rate is always non-negative.
Remark 5: The achievable perfect secrecy rate established in Corollary 1 can be larger than
the one obtained by coding separately over different parallel subchannels.
This remark is elucidated by the following example.
Example: We consider a deterministic parallel relay-eavesdropper channel with two subchan-
nels, i.e., L := 2, as shown in Fig. 3. For subchannel 1, the link capacities to the relay, legitimate
receiver and eavesdropper are given by Cr1,a = 4, Cr1,b = 3 and Ce1 = 2 respectively. For
subchannel 2, the link capacities to the relay, legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are given by
Cr2,a = 5, Cr2,b = 7 and Ce2 = 3 respectively. For this channel, achievable rate obtained by
coding across subchannels is given by
Re =min
{ 2∑
i=1
(Cri,a − Cei)+,
2∑
i=1
(Cri,b − Cei)+
}
=min{4, 5} = 4. (12)
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Similarly achievable rate obtained by coding separately over each subchannel is given by
Re =
2∑
i=1
min{(Cri,a − Cei)+, (Cri,b − Cei)+}
=min{2, 1}+min{2, 4} = 3 (13)
which is clearly smaller than (12). This shows the usefulness of coding across subchannels.
C. Upper Bound on the Perfect Secrecy Rate
The following theorem provides an upper bound on the secrecy rate for the parallel Gaussian
relay-eavesdropper channel.
Theorem 3: For the parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel (7), an upper bound on the
secrecy rate is given by
Rupe = max{KPl∈KPl}l=1,...,L
L∑
l=1
I(X1l, X2l; Yl)− I(X1l, X2l; Y2l) (14)
where the maximization is over [X1l, X2l] ∼ N (0,KPl) with KPl =
{
KPl : KPl=[
P1l ψl
√
P1lP2l
ψl
√
P1lP2l P2l
]
, −1 ≤ ψl ≤ 1
}
, l = 1, . . . , L, with the covariance matrices
E[X1[1,L]X
T
1[1,L]], E[X2[1,L]X
T
2[1,L]] satisfying (8) and (9) respectively.
Proof: The proof follows from the rate-equivocation region established for the DM case
in Theorem 1. Taking the first term of minimization in the bound on the equivocation rate in
Theorem 1, we get
Re ≤ max
L∑
l=1
I(V1l, V2l; Yl | Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul) (15)
where Ul → (V1l, V2l)→ (X1l, X2l)→ (Yl, Y1l, Y2l), for l = 1, . . . , L. The rest of the proof uses
elements from related works in [3] and [5]. Continuing from (15), we obtain
Re≤
L∑
l=1
I(V1l, V2l; Yl | Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul)
(a)
≤
L∑
l=1
I(V1l, V2l; Yl)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l)
≤
L∑
l=1
I(V1l, V2l; Yl, Y2l)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l)
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(b)
=
L∑
l=1
[I(X1l, X2l; Yl, Y2l)− I(X1l, X2l; Yl, Y2l | V1l, V2l)]
−[I(X1l, X2l; Y2l)− I(X1l, X2l; Y2l | V1l, V2l)]
=
L∑
l=1
[I(X1l, X2l; Yl, Y2l)− I(X1l, X2l; Y2l)]
−[I(X1l, X2l; Yl, Y2l | V1l, V2l)− I(X1l, X2l; Y2l | V1l, V2l)]
≤
L∑
l=1
[I(X1l, X2l; Yl, Y2l)− I(X1l, X2l; Y2l)]
=
L∑
l=1
I(X1l, X2l; Yl | Y2l) (16)
where (a) follows by noticing that I(V1l, V2l; Yl | Ul) − I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul) is maximized by
Ul := constant and (b) follows from the Markov chain condition (V1l, V2l) → (X1l, X2l) →
(Yl, Y1l, Y2l), l = 1, . . . , L.
We now tighten the upper bound (16) by using an argument previously used in [5], [6] in the
context of multi-antenna wiretap channel. More specifically, observing that, the original bound
(15) depends on p(yl, y2l|x1l, x2l) only through its marginals p(yl|x1l, x2l) and p(y2l|x1l, x2l), the
upper bound (16) can be further tightened as
Re ≤ min{p(y′
l
,y′
2l
|x1l,x2l)}
max
{p(x1l,x2l)}
L∑
l=1
I(X1l, X2l; Y
′
l | Y ′2l) (17)
where the joint conditional p(y′l, y′2l|x1l, x2l) has the same marginals as p(yl, y2l|x1l, x2l), i.e.,
p(y′l|x1l, x2l) = p(yl|x1l, x2l) and p(y′2l|x1l, x2l) = p(y2l|x1l, x2l).
It can be easily shown that the bound in (17) is maximized when the inputs are jointly Gaussian,
i.e., [X1l, X2l] ∼ N (0,KPl), KPl ∈ KPl with KPl =
{
KPl : KPl =
[
P1l ψl
√
P1lP2l
ψl
√
P1lP2l P2l
]
,−1 ≤
ψl ≤ 1
}
, l = 1, . . . , L with the covariance matrices E[X1[1,L]XT1[1,L]] and E[X2[1,L]XT2[1,L]]
satisfying (8) and (9) respectively [5], [6].
Next, using the specified Gaussian inputs, and proceeding as in [6], [20], the evaluation of
the upper bound (17) minimized over all possible correlations between Y ′l , Y ′2l, for l = 1, . . . , L
yields
Re ≤ max{KPl∈KPl}l=1,...,L
L∑
l=1
I(X1l, X2l; Yl)− I(X1l, X2l; Y2l). (18)
This concludes the proof.
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The computation of the upper bound (14) is given in Appendix II.
Remark 6: Viewing our Gaussian model (7) as a specific MIMO relay-eavesdropper channel
(i.e., one without interference), one can establish a genie-aided upper bound on the secrecy
capacity of the model (7) by using recent results on MIMO wiretap channels [4]–[6], by upper
bounding the secrecy rate that can be conveyed by the source and relay to the legitimate receiver
on the multi-access part of the channel with that of an interference-free MIMO wiretap channel
with 2L-transmit antenna at the sender, L-receive antenna at the legitimate receiver and L-receive
antenna at the eavesdropper. However, in contrast to (14), the upper bound obtained this way
does not show any degree of separability. More specifically, using [4]–[6], one can argue that
the following is an upper-bound on the secrecy capacity of the model (7),
Re ≤ I(X1[1,L], X2[1,L]; Y[1,L])− I(X1[1,L], X2[1,L]; Y2[1,L]) (19)
for some [X1[1,L]X2[1,L]] ∼ N (0,KP), and KP = E[(X1[1,L]X2[1,L])(X1[1,L]X2[1,L])T ] has diagonal
entries that satisfies (8) and (9) respectively.
Because the equivalent MIMO channel is interference-free, the upper bound (19) can be written
equivalently as
Re ≤
L∑
l=1
I(X1l, X2l; Yl|Y l−1)− I(X1l, X2l; Y2l|Y l−12 ). (20)
Now, observe that (20) does not show any degree of separability as in (14), basically because
of the additional conditioning on Y l−12 , for l = 1, . . . , L.
Also, investigating our proof in the Gaussian case, one can see that the RHS of (15) and its
proof are fundamental. As mentioned in the proof, we could obtain the final form (18) essentially
because the upper bound (15) that we established depends on the conditional joint distribution
p(yl, y2l|x1l, x2l) only through its marginals.
Example Application: We consider a parallel relay channel with interference at the eavesdrop-
per. The received signals at the relay, destination and eavesdropper are given by
Y1l,i = X1l,i + Z1l,i
Yl,i = X1l,i +
√
ρ1lX2l,i + Zl,i
Y2l,i = X1l,i +
√
ρ2lX2l,i +
L∑
k=1,k 6=l
X1k,i +
√
ρ2kX2k,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
interference
+Z2l,i. (21)
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This model can represent the equivalent channel model of a MIMO relay-eavesdropper channel
with the interference at the relay and legitimate receiver avoided through singular-value
decomposition; as the source can always get some feedback from both the relay and legitimate
receiver, and the relay from the legitimate receiver, which then transforms the MIMO transmission
into one on parallel channels among the source, relay and legitimate receiver. The eavesdropper
however does not feedback information on his channel, and so is subjected to cross-antenna
interference. Constraining the eavesdropper to treat the cross-antenna interference as independent
noise, one can obtain an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the model with constrained
eavesdropper by direct application of (14). Straightforward algebra gives
Re ≤ max∑L
l=1 P1l≤P1,∑L
l=1 P2l≤P2,−1≤ψl≤1
for l = 1, . . . , L
L∑
l=1
C
(
P1l + ρ1lP2l + 2ψl
√
ρ1lP1lP2l
σ2l
)
− C
(
P1l + ρ2lP2l + 2ψl
√
ρ2lP1lP2l∑L
k=1,k 6=l P1k +
√
ρ2kP2k + 2ψk
√
ρ2kP1kP2k + σ22l
)
. (22)
Then, it is clear that the upper bound (22) holds also for the model (21) with a non-constrained
eavesdropper.
D. Secrecy Capacity in Some Special Cases
We now study the case in which the S-R links are very noisy, i.e., the relay does not hear the
source.
Theorem 4: For the model (7), if the relay does not hear the source:
1) An upper bound on the perfect secrecy rate is given by
Rupe = max
L∑
l=1
C
(
P1l
σ2l
)
− C
(
P1l
σ22l + ρ2lP2l
)
(23)
where the maximization is over {P1l, P2l}, l = 1, . . . , L, such that
∑L
l=1 P1l ≤ P1 and∑L
l=1 P2l ≤ P2.
2) A lower bound on the perfect secrecy rate is given by
Rlowe = max
L∑
l=1
C
(
P1l
σ2l
)
− C
(
P1l
σ22l + ρ2lP2l
)
(24)
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where the maximization is over {P1l, P2l}, l = 1, . . . , L, such that
∑L
l=1 P1l ≤ P1,∑L
l=1 P2l ≤ P2 and
L∑
l=1
C
(
ρ1lP2l
P1l + σ2l
)
≥
L∑
l=1
C
(
ρ2lP2l
σ22l
)
. (25)
Proof:
Upper Bound. The bound in (23) is established as follows. Our approach borrows elements
from an upper bounding technique that is used in [18], and can be seen as an extension of it
to the case of parallel relay-eavesdropper channels. Assume that all links between the relay and
the destination are noiseless, and the eavesdropper is constrained to treat the relay’s signal as
unknown noise. As mentioned in [18], any upper bound for this model with full relay-destination
cooperation and constrained eavesdropper also applies to the model of Theorem 4.
Now, for the model with full relay-destination cooperation and constrained eavesdropper, we
develop an upper bound on the secrecy rate as follows. In this case, the destination can remove
the effect of the relay transmission (which is independent from the source transmission as the
relay does not hear the source), and the equivalent channel to the destination can be written as
Y ′l,i = X1l,i + Zl,i. (26)
The eavesdropper is constrained in the sense that it is restricted not to decode the relay’s signals.
Mathematically, this can be stated as follows. Let Z ′2l be a random variable that has the same
distribution as X2l and PZ′
2l
(z) = PX2l(z), and represents unknown noise at the eavesdropper.
The channel output at the constrained eavesdropper is given by
Y ′2l,i = X1l,i +
√
ρ2lZ
′
2l,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
unknown noise
+Z2l,i. (27)
For the constrained eavesdropper the relay’s transmission acts as unknown noise, with the worst
case obtained with Z ′2l being Gaussian, for l = 1, . . . , L. The rest of the proof follows by simply
observing that the resulting model (with the worst case relay transmission to the eavesdropper
and full relay-destination cooperation) is, in fact, a parallel Gaussian wiretap channel, the secrecy
capacity of which is established in [3], i.e.,
Cs = max
L∑
l=1
I(X1l; Y
′
l )− I(X1l; Y ′2l) (28)
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where the maximization is over X1l ∼ N (0, P1l) and X2l ∼ N (0, P2l), l = 1, . . . , L, with∑L
l=1 P1l ≤ P1 and
∑L
l=1 P2l ≤ P2.
Finally, straightforward algebra which is omitted for brevity shows that the computation of
(28) gives (23).
Lower Bound. The proof of the lower bound follows by evaluating the equivocation in
Theorem 2 with a specific choice of the variables. More specifically, evaluating (5) with the
choice |Ac| := L, V1l := X1l, V2l := X2l, with X1l ∼ N (0, P1l) independent of X2l ∼ N (0, P2l),
l = 1, . . . , L and such that (25) is satisfied, we get the rate expression in the RHS of (24). The
RHS of (24) then follows by maximization over all {P1l, P2l}, l = 1, . . . , L, satisfying (25) and
the total power constraints
∑L
l=1 P1l ≤ P1 and
∑L
l=1 P2l ≤ P2.
Remark 7: The upper (23) and lower (24) bounds on the perfect secrecy rate of Theorem
4 have same expressions but are maximized over different input sets. These bounds coincide
only when the inputs ({P1l, P2l}) that maximize the upper bound (23) also satisfy (25). For this
specific case, perfect secrecy is established and is given by
Cs = max
L∑
l=1
C
(
P1l
σ2l
)
− C
(
P1l
σ22l + ρ2lP2l
)
(29)
where the maximization is over {P1l, P2l}, l = 1, . . . , L, such that
∑L
l=1 P1l ≤ P1,
∑L
l=1 P2l ≤ P2
and
L∑
l=1
C
(
ρ1lP2l
P1l + σ2l
)
≥
L∑
l=1
C
(
ρ2lP2l
σ22l
)
. (30)
IV. EXAMPLE APPLICATION
In this section we apply the results which we established for the Gaussian memoryless model
in section III to study a fading relay-eavesdropper channel.
For a fading relay-eavesdropper channel, the received signals at the relay, legitimate receiver
and eavesdropper are given by
Y1,i = hsr,iX1,i + Z1,i
Yi = hsd,iX1,i + hrd,iX2,i + Zi
Y2,i = hse,iX1,i + hre,iX2,i + Z2,i (31)
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where i is the time index, hsd,i, hrd,i, hse,i, hre,i and hsr,i are the fading gain coefficients associated
with S-D, R-D, S-E, R-E and S-R links, given by complex Gaussian random variables with zero
mean and unit variance respectively. The noise processes {Z1,i}, {Zi}, {Z2,i} are zero mean i.i.d
complex Gaussian random variables with variances σ21 , σ2 and σ22 respectively. The source and
relay input sequences are subject to an average power constraint, i.e., ∑ni=1 E[‖ X1,i ‖2] ≤ nP1,∑n
i=1 E[‖ X2,i ‖2] ≤ nP2. We define h¯i := [hsd,i hrd,i hse,i hre,i hsr,i] and assume that perfect
non-causal channel state information (CSI) is available at all nodes. For a given fading state
realization h¯i, the fading relay-eavesdropper channel is a Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel.
Therefore, for a given channel state with L fading state realizations, i.e., h¯ = {h¯i}Li=1, the fading
relay-eavesdropper channel can be seen as a parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel with
L subchannels. The power allocation vectors at the source and relay are denoted by P1(h¯) and
P2(h¯) respectively. The ergodic achievable secrecy rate of the fading relay-eavesdropper channel
(31), which follows from (11) is given by
Rlowe = max
E[P1(h¯)]≤P1,
E[P2(h¯)]≤P2,
0≤α(h¯)≤1
min
{
Eh¯∈A
[
2C
(
|hsd|2P1(h¯) + |hrd|2P2(h¯) + 2
√
α¯(h¯)|hsd|2P1(h¯)|hrd|2P2(h¯)
σ2
)
− 2C
(
|hse|2P1(h¯) + |hre|2P2(h¯) + 2
√
α¯(h¯)|hse|2P1(h¯)|hre|2P2(h¯)
σ22
)]+
,Eh¯∈A
[
2C
(
α(h¯)|hsr |2P1(h¯)
σ21
)
− 2C
(
|hse|2P1(h¯) + |hre|2P2(h¯) + 2
√
α¯(h¯)|hse|2P1(h¯)|hre|2P2(h¯)
σ22
)]+}
+min
{
Eh¯∈Ac
[
2C
(
|hsd|2P1(h¯) + |hrd|2P2(h¯)
σ2
)
− 2C
(
|hse|2P1(h¯) + |hre|2P2(h¯)
σ22
)]+
,
Eh¯∈Ac
[
2C
(
|hsd|2P1(h¯)
σ2
)
+ 2C
(
|hre|2P2(h¯)
σ22
)
− 2C
(
|hse|2P1(h¯) + |hre|2P2(h¯)
σ22
)]+}
. (32)
The upper bound for the fading relay-eavesdropper channel (31) follows directly from the upper
bound established for the parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel (14). Straightforward
algebra which is omitted for brevity gives
Rupe = max
E[P1(h¯)]≤P1,
E[P2(h¯)]≤P2,
−1≤ψ(h¯)≤1
Eh¯
{
2C
(
|hsd|2P1(h¯) + |hrd|2P2(h¯) + 2ψ(h¯)
√
|hsd|2P1(h¯)|hrd|2P2(h¯)
σ2
)
− 2C
(
|hse|2P1(h¯) + |hre|2P2(h¯) + 2ψ(h¯)
√
|hse|2P1(h¯)|hre|2P2(h¯)
σ22
)}
. (33)
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we provide numerical examples to illustrate the performance of fading relay-
eavesdropper channel. We consider a fading relay-eavesdropper channel with L realizations of
fading state. It is assumed that perfect channel state information is available at all nodes. We can
consider this channel as a Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel with L subchannels. Alternatively,
this model can be seen as an OFDM system with L sub-carriers. We model channel gain between
node i ∈ {s, r} and j ∈ {r, d, e} as distance dependent Rayleigh fading, that is, hi,j = h′i,jd−γ/2i,j ,
where γ is the path loss exponent, di,j is the distance between the node i and j, and h′i,j is
a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance one. Each subchannel is
corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance one. Furthermore,
for each symbol transmission same subchannel is used on S-R and R-D links to make the
optimization tractable. The objective function for both lower and upper bounds are optimized
numerically using AMPL with a commercially available solver, for instance SNOPT.
To illustrate the system performance, we set the source and relay power to 64 Watt each. We
consider a network geometry in which the source is located at the point (0,0), the relay is located
at the point (d,0), the destination is located at the point (1,0) and the eavesdropper is located at
the point (0,1), where d is the distance between the source and the relay. In all numerical results
we set path loss exponent γ:=2 and L := 64. For all numerical examples, secrecy rate is given
by bits per channel use. For each subchannel the selection of the coding scheme at the relay is
based on the relative strength of the S-D link w.r.t the S-R link, i.e., we use NF scheme (set
Ac) when |hsd|2 ≥ |hsr|2 and DF scheme (set A) when |hsd|2 < |hsr|2. Fig. 4 shows the power
allocation for a fading channel with 64 subchannels where the relay is located at (0.5,0), and
marker ‘×’ denotes NF on a particular subchannel while marker ‘’ denotes DF on a particular
subchannel. It can be seen from Fig. 4 that, achievable perfect secrecy rate is zero for some
subchannels. Roughly speaking, this happens when the condition |hrd|2 > |hre|2 is violated.
Fig. 5 compares the average perfect secrecy rate of the lower bound, with optimized power
allocation and with uniform power allocation, i.e., allocating same power at the source and
relay for all subchannels in h¯ ∈ A and in h¯ ∈ Ac. It can be seen that for separate source and
relay powers, optimized power allocation scheme outperforms uniform power allocation scheme.
This fact follows because optimized power allocation scheme maximizes the achievable perfect
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secrecy rate and hence enhances the system performance.
Mode selection at the relay by only considering the relative strength of the S-D and the S-R
link in the lower bound is suboptimal because the achievable secrecy rate (32) also depends on
the gain of other link. We now consider the case in which the relay selects the scheme which
maximizes the rate for each subchannel. We plot the lower bound with this criteria and compare
it with the case in which same scheme is used on all subchannels. As a reference we consider
the case in which there is no relay, i.e., a parallel wiretap channel. Fig. 6 shows the achievable
average perfect secrecy rate of different schemes. It can be seen that when the relay is close to
the source, DF scheme on all subchannels gives higher secrecy rate. Similarly when the relay is
close to the destination, NF scheme on all subchannels offers better rate. The region when the
relay is between 0.5 < d < 1.2 is of particular interest. In this region the relay selects between
DF scheme and NF scheme for each subchannel and utilizes the gain from both schemes. It
is interesting to note that when the relay is close to the destination, use of DF scheme on all
subchannels does not offer any gain because in this case the relay is unable to decode the source
codewords and hence the average secrecy rate decreases. The lower bound always perform better
than the wiretap channel which shows the usefulness of the relay.
In Fig. 7 we compare the lower bound obtained in Fig. 6, with the upper bound on the secrecy
capacity for the fading relay-eavesdropper channel. It can be seen that when the relay is close
to the source, the lower and upper bounds coincide. This is achieved by using DF scheme on
all subchannels.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the problem of secure communication over parallel relay channel. Outer and inner
bounds on the rate-equivocation are established for the DM case. Developing an outer bound
on the parallel relay-eavesdropper channel is non-trivial and it does not follow directly from
the one established in [12]. For the Gaussian memoryless case, lower and upper bounds on the
perfect secrecy rate are established. The computable upper bound for the Gaussian model shows
some separability over subchannels. In the case in which the relay does not hear the source,
under some specific conditions the lower and upper bounds coincide and secrecy capacity is
established. We apply the results established for the Gaussian memoryless model to a more
practical fading relay-eavesdropper channel. Numerical examples showed that power adjustment
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among parallel channels results in higher secrecy rate.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof generalizes the results of Theorem 1 in [12] and uses elements from a similar proof
in the context of parallel BCC in [3].
a) We first bound the equivocation rate as follows.
nRe = H(W | Y n2[1,L])
= H(W )− I(W ; Y n2[1,L])
= I(W ; Y n[1,L])− I(W ; Y n2[1,L]) +H(W | Y n[1,L])
(a)
≤ I(W ; Y n[1,L])− I(W ; Y n2[1,L]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
I(W ; Y nl | Y n[1,l−1])− I(W ; Y n2l | Y n2[l+1,L]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1])− I(W ; Y2li | Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W,Y n2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L]; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1])− I(Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]; Yli |W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1])
−I(W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]; Y2li | Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + I(Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]; Y2li |W,Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + nǫn
(b)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W,Y n2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L]; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1])− I(W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]; Y2li | Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])
+nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L]; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]) + I(W ; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])
−I(Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]; Y2li | Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])− I(W ; Y2li | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + nǫn
(c)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])− I(W ; Y2li | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])
+nǫn (34)
where ǫn → 0 as n → ∞; (a) follows from Fano’s inequality; and (b) and (c) follows from
lemma 7 in [2].
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We introduce a random variable T uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n} and set, Uli :=
Y i−1l , Y
n
[1,l−1], Y
n
2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L], V1li := W,Y
n
2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L] and V2li := Y
i−1
l , Y
n
[1,l−1]. We define
Ul = (T, Uli), V1l = (T, V1li), V2l = (T, V2li), X1l = X1T , X2l = X2T , Yl = YT , Y1l = Y1T , Y2l =
Y2T , for l = 1, . . . , L. Note that (Ul, V1l, V2l, X1l, X2l, Yl, Y1l, Y2l) satisfies the following Markov
chain condition
Ul → (V1l, V2l)→ (X1l, X2l)→ (Yl, Y1l, Y2l), for l = 1, . . . , L.
Thus, we have
Re ≤ 1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])
−I(W ; Y2li | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + ǫn
=
1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W,Y i−1l , Y
n
[1,l−1], Y
n
2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L]; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])
−I(W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]; Y2li | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + ǫn
(d)
=
1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(V1li, V2li; Yli | Uli)− I(V1li, V2li; Y2li | Uli) + ǫn (35)
(e)
=
L∑
l=1
I(V1l, V2l; Yl | Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul) + ǫn (36)
where (d) and (e) follow by using the above definition.
We can also bound the equivocation rate as follows. We continue from (34) to get
Re ≤ 1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])
−I(W ; Y2li | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + ǫn
=
1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W,Y n2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L]; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])
−I(W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]; Y2li | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + ǫn
≤ 1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W,Y n2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L]; Yli, Y1li | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L])
−I(W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]; Y2li | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + ǫn
(f)
=
1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(V1li; Yli, Y1li | V2li, Uli)− I(V1li, V2li; Y2li | Uli) + ǫn (37)
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(g)
=
L∑
l=1
I(V1l; Yl, Y1l | V2l, Ul)− I(V1l, V2l; Y2l | Ul) + ǫn (38)
where (f) and (g) follow from the above definition.
b) We now bound the rate R as follows.
nR = H(W )
= I(W ; Y n[1,L]) +H(W | Y n[1,L])
(h)
≤ I(W ; Y n[1,L]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
I(W ; Y nl | Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
H(Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1])−H(Yli |W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
(i)
≤
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
H(Yli)−H(Yli |W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
(j)
≤
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
H(Yli)−H(Yli |W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W,Y i−1l , Y
n
[1,l−1], Y
n
2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L]; Yli) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(V1li, V2li; Yli) + nǫn. (39)
Hence, we have
R ≤ 1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(V1li, V2li; Yli) + ǫn
≤
L∑
l=1
I(V1l, V2l; Yl) + ǫn (40)
where (h) follows from Fano’s inequality; (i) and (j) follows from the fact that conditioning
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reduces entropy. We can also bound the rate R as follows
nR = H(W )
= I(W ; Y n[1,L]) +H(W | Y n[1,L])
(k)
≤ I(W ; Y n[1,L]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
I(W ; Y nl | Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
≤
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W ; Y1li, Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
H(Y1li, Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1])−H(Y1li, Yli | W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
(l)
≤
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
H(Y1li, Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1])−H(Y1li, Yli | W,Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1], Y n2l[i+1], Y n2[l+1,L]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(W,Y n2l[i+1], Y
n
2[l+1,L]; Y1li, Yli | Y i−1l , Y n[1,l−1]) + nǫn
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(V1li; Y1li, Yli | V2li) + nǫn. (41)
Hence, we have
R ≤ 1
n
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
I(V1li; Y1li, Yli | V2li) + ǫn
≤
L∑
l=1
I(V1l; Yl, Y1l | V2l) + ǫn (42)
where (k) follows from Fano’s inequality; and (l) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces
the entropy.
Therefore an outer bound on the achievable rate equivocation region is given by the following
set:
⋃{
(R,Re) that satisfy (36), (38), (40), (42)
}
(43)
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where the union is over all probability distributions p(u[1,L], v1[1,L], v2[1,L], x1[1,L], x2[1,L], y[1,L], y1[1,L],
y2[1,L]). Finally we note that the terms in (36),(38),(40), and (42) depend on the
probability distribution p(u[1,L], v1[1,L], v2[1,L], x1[1,L], x2[1,L], y[1,L], y1[1,L], y2[1,L]) only through
p(ul, v1l, v2l, x1l, x2l, yl, y1l, y2l). Hence, there is no loss of optimality to consider only those
distributions that have the form
L∏
l=1
p(ul, v1l, v2l)p(x1l, x2l | ul, v1l, v2l)p(yl, y1l, y2l | x1l, x2l). (44)
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX II
We compute the upper bound on secrecy rate for the parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper
channel as follows.
max
{KPl∈KPl}l=1,...,L
L∑
l=1
I(X1l, X2l; Yl)− I(X1l, X2l; Y2l)
= max
{KPl∈KPl}l=1,...,L
L∑
l=1
[h(Yl)− h(Yl | X1l, X2l)− h(Y2l) + h(Y2l | X1l, X2l)]
= max
{KPl∈KPl}l=1,...,L
L∑
l=1
[h(Yl)− h(Zl)− h(Y2l) + h(Z2l)]. (45)
The first term in (45) is computed as follows.
h(Yl) = h(X1l +
√
ρ1lX2l + Zl)
=
1
2
log(2πe)(P1l + ρ1lP2l + 2ψl
√
ρ1lP1lP2l + σ
2
l ). (46)
Similarly the second, third and fourth term in (45) are computed as follows.
h(Zl) =
1
2
log 2πe(σ2l ) (47)
h(Y2l) =
1
2
log(2πe)(P1l + ρ2lP2l + 2ψl
√
ρ2lP1lP2l + σ
2
2l) (48)
h(Z2l) =
1
2
log 2πe(σ22l). (49)
Using (46)-(49) in (45) gives
Rupe = max∑
L
l=1
P1l≤P1,∑
L
l=1
P2l≤P2,
−1≤ψl≤1
for l = 1, . . . , L
L∑
l=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
P1l + ρ1lP2l + 2ψl
√
ρ1lP1lP2l
σ2l
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
P1l + ρ2lP2l + 2ψl
√
ρ2lP1lP2l
σ22l
)
.
(50)
TO APPEAR IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 25
REFERENCES
[1] A. D. Wyner, “The wiretap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 54, pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[2] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May. 1978.
[3] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz), “Secure communication over fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2470–2492, Jun. 2008.
[4] T. Liu and S. Shamai (Shitz), “A note on the secrecy capacity of the multi-antenna wiretap channel,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 2547–2553, Jun. 2009.
[5] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas II: The MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, Nov. 2010.
[6] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel,” Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/0710.1920.
[7] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The Gaussian multiple access wire-tap channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 54, no. 12, pp. 5747–5755, Dec. 2008.
[8] ——, “The general Gaussian multiple access and two-way wire-tap channels: Achievable rates and cooperative jamming,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2735–2751, Jun. 2008.
[9] Y. Liang and H. V. Poor, “Multiple access channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 976–1002, Mar. 2008.
[10] J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless channels,” in IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory, Seattle, USA, Jul. 2006, pp. 356–360.
[11] P. K. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. E. Gamal, “On the secrecy capacity of fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 54, no. 12, pp. 4687–4698, Oct. 2008.
[12] L. Lai and H. E. Gamal, “The relay eavesdropper channel: Cooperation for secrecy,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 4005–4019, Sep. 2008.
[13] M. Yuksel and E. Erkip, “The relay channel with a wire-tapper,” in 41st Annual Conference on Information Sciences and
Systems, Baltimore, MD, USA, Mar. 2007, pp. 13–18.
[14] ——, “Secure communication with a relay helping the wire-tapper,” in IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Lake Tahoe,
CA, USA, Sep. 2007, pp. 595–600.
[15] X. He and A. Yener, “Cooperation with an untrusted relay: A secrecy perspective,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 56, no. 8, pp. 3801–3827, Aug. 2010.
[16] Y. Liang, V. V. Veeravalli, and H. V. Poor, “Resource allocation for wireless fading relay channels: max-min solution,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 53, no. 10, pp. 3432–3453, Oct. 2007.
[17] Z. Li, R. Yates, and W. Trappe, “Secrecy capacity of independent parallel channels,” in 44th Annual Allerton Conference
Communication, Control and Computing, Monticello, IL, USA, Sept. 2006, pp. 841–848.
[18] V. Aggarwal, L. Sankar, A. R. Calderbank, and H. V. Poor, “Secrecy capacity of a class of orthogonal relay eavesdropper
channels,” EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Special Issue on Wireless Physical Layer
Security, vol. 2009.
[19] R. G. Gallager, Information theory and reliable communication. New York:Wiley, 1968.
[20] A. A. Khisti, A. Tchamkerten, and G. W. Wornell, “Secure broadcasting over fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2453–2469, Jun. 2008.
TO APPEAR IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 26
Zohaib Hassan Awan received the B.S. degree in Electronics Engineering from Ghulam Ishaq Khan
Institute (GIKI), Topi, Pakistan in 2005 and the M.S. degree in Electrical Engineering with majors in
wireless systems from Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, Sweden in 2008. Since Jan.
2009, he has been working towards his Ph.D. degree with the ICTEAM institute, Universite´ catholique
de Louvain (UCL), Belgium.
His research interests include information-theoretic security, cooperative communications and commu-
nication theory.
Abdellatif Zaidi received the B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from ´Ecole Nationale Supe´rieure de
Techniques Avance´s, ENSTA ParisTech, France in 2002 and the M. Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in Electrical
Engineering from ´Ecole Nationale Supe´rieure des Te´le´communications, TELECOM ParisTech, Paris,
France in 2002 and 2005, respectively.
From December 2002 to December 2005, he was with the Communications and Electronics Dept.,
TELECOM ParisTech, Paris, France and the Signals and Systems Lab., CNRS/Supe´lec, France pursuing
his PhD degree. From May 2006 to September 2010, he was at ´Ecole Polytechnique de Louvain, Universite´ catholique de
Louvain, Belgium, working as a research assistant. Dr. Zaidi was ”Research Visitor” at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana,
USA, during fall 2007 and Spring 2008. He is now, an assistant professor at Universite´ Paris-Est Marne-la-Valle´e, France.
His research interests cover a broad range of topics from signal processing for communication and multi-user information
theory. Of particular interest are the problems of coding for side-informed channels, secure communication, coding and
interference mitigation in multi-user channels, and relaying problems and cooperative communication with application to sensor
networking and ad-hoc wireless networks.
TO APPEAR IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 27
Luc Vandendorpe (M’93-SM’99-F’06) was born in Mouscron, Belgium, in 1962. He received the
Electrical Engineering degree (summa cum laude) and the Ph. D. degree from the Universite´ catholique de
Louvain (UCL) Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium in 1985 and 1991 respectively. Since 1985, L. Vandendorpe is
with the Communications and Remote Sensing Laboratory of UCL where he first worked in the field of bit
rate reduction techniques for video coding. In 1992, he was a Visiting Scientist and Research Fellow at the
Telecommunications and Traffic Control Systems Group of the Delft Technical University, Netherlands,
where he worked on Spread Spectrum Techniques for Personal Communications Systems. From October 1992 to August 1997,
L. Vandendorpe was Senior Research Associate of the Belgian NSF at UCL. Presently, he is Full Professor and Head of the
Institute for Information and Communication Technologies, Electronics and Applied Mathematics of UCL.
His current interest is in digital communication systems and more precisely resource allocation for OFDM(A) based multicell
systems, MIMO and distributed MIMO, sensor networks, turbo-based communications systems, physical layer security and UWB
based positioning.
In 1990, he was co-recipient of the Biennal Alcatel-Bell Award from the Belgian NSF for a contribution in the field of
image coding. In 2000 he was co-recipient (with J. Louveaux and F. Deryck) of the Biennal Siemens Award from the Belgian
NSF for a contribution about filter bank based multicarrier transmission. In 2004 he was co-winner (with J. Czyz) of the Face
Authentication Competition, FAC 2004. L. Vandendorpe is or has been TPC member for numerous IEEE conferences (VTC
Fall, Globecom Communications Theory Symposium, SPAWC, ICC) and for the Turbo Symposium. He was co-technical chair
(with P. Duhamel) for IEEE ICASSP 2006.
He was an editor of the IEEE Trans. on Communications for Synchronization and Equalization between 2000 and 2002,
associate editor of the IEEE Trans. on Wireless Communications between 2003 and 2005, and associate editor of the IEEE
Trans. on Signal Processing between 2004 and 2006. He was chair of the IEEE Benelux joint chapter on Communications
and Vehicular Technology between 1999 and 2003. He was an elected member of the Signal Processing for Communications
committee between 2000 and 2005, and between 2009 and 2011, and an elected member of the Sensor Array and Multichannel
Signal Processing committee of the Signal Processing Society between 2006 and 2008. Currently, he is the Editor in Chief for
the Eurasip Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking. L. Vandendorpe is a Fellow of the IEEE.
TO APPEAR IN IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 28
+
R
X11
Y11 X21
Y1
Z11
+
Z1
+
R
X1L
Y1L X2L
Z1L
Eavesdropper
+
+
YL+
ZL
Z21
Z2L
Y21
Y2L
Fig. 2. The parallel Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel.
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Fig. 3. An example of a deterministic parallel relay-eavesdropper channel with two subchannels.
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Fig. 4. Achievable perfect secrecy rate of a parallel relay-eavesdropper channel.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of achievable perfect secrecy rate of the lower bound with optimized power allocation and with uniform
power allocation over all subchannels.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of achievable perfect secrecy rate of some schemes with the lower bound.
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Fig. 7. Bounds on perfect secrecy rate.
